April, 1942

RECENT CASES
Actions-Nature of Liability for Failure to Perform Gratuitous
Promise-Defendant telephone company contracted to furnish plaintiff with the usual telephone service. Plaintiff alleges in his declaration
that defendant negligently failed to provide him with service; thus plaintiff was unable to notify the fire department of the outbreak of a fire in
his barn, and the barn was burned. Held, Defendant's demurrer to the
declaration sustained. Plaintiff's cause of action is in contract, and no
notice of special risk is alleged. Buskey v. New England Telephone and
Telegraph Co., 23 A. (2d) 367 (N. H. 1941).
The instant decision is well founded in authority; 1 sometimes an
action in tort is permitted on a similar state of facts, but even then a contract rule of damages is often applied.2 The striking feature of the instant
decision is its partial overruling of the Court's former holding in Carr
v. Maine Cent. R. R.' Plaintiff in the instant case, evidently realizing
the authority against him if he declared in contract,4 relied on the Carr
case so that he might found his action in tort.5 The instant decision overrules the Carr case to the extent that it held that the theory of that action
was tort, though no exception is taken to the result of that decision. The
problem of liability through failure to perform a promise gratuitously given
has been a troubling one in the law; social feelings dictate recovery in such
circumstances, yet legal fictions have been slow to yield. When the promise has been coupled with a bailment, recovery has been generally granted. 6
Lacking such bailment, however, recovery has been more difficult to square
with traditional views on consideration, and the law has been reluctant to
find a tort duty.7 The Carr case by announcing a clear tort duty as a
basis for recovery gave promise that the implicitly accepted bailment test
was on the wane; clearly, the only source of a tort duty is the lulling of
the plaintiff into a false sense of security, and this basis would be present
whether or not the defendant is in the position of a bailee. The instant
decision finds that the consideration for the gratuitous promise in the Carr
case was the plaintiff's forbearance to act; since this does not fit the traditional definitions of consideration," it is to be doubted that it will be
i. Barrett v. New England Tel. and Tel. Co., 8o N. H. 354, 117 Atl. 264 (1922),
23 A. L. R. 947, 952 (1923).

2. Southern Telephone Co. v. King, lO3 Ark. i6o, 146 S. W. 489 (1912); Note

(1936) 46 YALE L. J. 167; (1929) 13 MINN. L. REV. 16o.
3. 78 N. H. 5o2, 102 Atl. 532 (1917).

The action was on the case for negligence. Defendant had certain of the plaintiff's papers which were to be filed before the Interstate Commerce Commission so that
plaintiff could get a rebate. Defendant assured plaintiff that he would file them, but
failed to do so. The court overruled defendant's demurrer, and defendant excepted;
the exceptions were overruled. The court said that the defendant owed the plaintiff a
duty to do what the average man would have done notwithstanding the lack of consideration.
4. See note I supra.
5. By declaring in tort plaintiff manifestly sought to avoid the contract rule of
damages laid down in Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. (W. H. & G.) 34 (1854).
6. Schroeder v. Mauzy, 16 Cal. App. 443, 118 Pac. 459 (1911) ; Siegel v. Spear,
234 N. Y. 479, 138 N. E. 414 (1925) ;

STORY,

BAILMENTS

(9th ed. 1878) 163; Arter-

burn, Liability for Breach of GratuitousPromises (1927) 22 ILL. L. REv. 161. It is to
be noted that this bailment test is seldom explicit in the cases. Note further that there
is a bailment of the papers in the Carr case.
7. Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. 84 (N. Y. 18o9) ; Note (1923) 23 COL. L. REV. 573.
8. Note 7 supra.
(740)
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imported to support a promise where there is no bailment. It is further
to be remarked that the court in the instant case was- under no necessity
to overrule the Carr case; they are distinguishable, for it is difficult to find
in the instant case the degree of reliance or the false sense of security,
which must be the source of the duty in the Carr case.

Constitutional Law-Litvinov Assignment Entitles United
States Rather Than Foreign Creditors to Assets of Russian Insurance
Company-In 1918 and 1919 Russian government nationalized business
and property of Russian insurance companies wherever situated. In 1931
New York Court of Appeals directed Superintendent of Insurance, who
had paid domestic policyholders and creditors, to dispose of the remaining
assets of the First Russian Insurance Co. to foreign creditors. United
States recognized the Soviet Government in 1933 and by the Litvinov
Assignment became assignee of its claims in the United States. By virtue
of that assignment United States claims, as against the foreign creditors,
funds which were the subject of the 1931 court order. Held (two justices
dissenting),' for United States; to preserve the supremacy of the federal
government over foreign affairs New York property law must yield to the
Litvinov Assignment, which, although a mere executive agreement, is, like
a treaty, the supreme law of the land. United States v. Pink, 62 Sup. Ct.
552 (1942).
The Constitution provides that a treaty is the supreme law of the
land 2 if ratified by two-thirds of the Senate.3 Unmentioned is the status
of an executive agreement. Although the power to make executive agreements is well established, 4 in the United States, unlike England,5 there
has been evolved no test as to when Senate ratification is necessary. The
majority in the instant case, relying on United States v. Belmont,6 held
that recognition of Russia and the Litvinov Assignment made the Russian
decrees binding in New York, thus giving to an executive agreement the
dignity of a treaty.7 The broad language used marks the farthest step
toward making executive control over international affairs plenary.8 The
dissent, taking a narrower view, distinguished the Belmont case,9 holding
I. Stone, C. J., and Roberts, J., dissented.
2. U. S. CONST. Art. VI, § 2.
3. U. S. CoNsr. Art. II, § 2.
4. United States v. Belmont, 3O1 U. S. 324 (1937) ; United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Co., 299 U. S. 304 (1936).
5. In England when giving effect to a treaty involves a fiscal charge on the public
funds or a change in the law of the land, the consent of Parliament must be obtained.
See 2 ANSON, LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE CONSTITUTION (3d ed. 1907) part I, 54; Levitan, Executive Agreements: A Study of the Executive in the Control of the Foreign
Relations of the United States (1940) 35 ILL. L. Rzv. 365, 375.
6. 301 U. S. 324 (1937).
7. Instant case at 565. The majority also looked at the history of the relations
between the United States and Russia that brought the recognition of the Soviet government and the Litvinov Assignment, and from this decided that it could not have
been intended for State law to prevail in this situation. Since New York could find
nothing in the recognition nor in the assignment that would support any other finding,
the unusual circumstances compel the majority decision.
8. Previous cases have given weight to agreements reached under statutory authority. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U. S. 304 (1936) ; B. Altman &

Co. v. United States,

224

U. S. 538

(1912).

q. The dissent points out that the broad language of the Behont case is merely
dictum. In the Belmont case the court passed on the sufficiency of the pleadings, the
demurrer admitting the allegation in the complaint that under the decree the property

742

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

that the disposition of property within a State is a matter of State law and
cannot be affected by such an informal agreement. Although the court
argued that a contrary result would amount to an invasion of federal
authority,10 the real ground for the decision is the fear of international
repercussions, for the Court hesitates to weaken by adverse decisions the
position of the executive in international bargaining.:"
Nothing should
be done to "imperil the amicable relations between governments and vex
the peace of nations". 12 But if State policy must yield, no harm can be
done by requiring such a far-reaching international compact to be ratified
by the representatives of the people. The result in the instant case renders
treaties superfluous and precludes Senatorial power over foreign affairs.
It is submitted that the distinction between executive agreements and
treaties should be preserved. While an executive agreement may be binding on the nation as a whole, it should not override the policy of a State
as to the disposition of property within its jurisdiction.' s

Decedents' Estates-Doctrine of Retainer and the Debtor Distributee Who Has Been Discharged in Bankruptcy-Plaintiff was
indebted to his father and was discharged in bankruptcy after payment of
a dividend. Thereafter father died intestate and plaintiff petitioned for a
sale of the father's real estate and a division of the proceeds. Defendants,
co-heirs, alleged plaintiff indebted to the estate for an amount greater than
his distributive share. Held, for defendants, although the debt was discharged in bankruptcy proceedings it is chargeable to plaintiff in an accounting for the distribution of the estate among the distributees. Leach
v. Arntrong et al., 156 S. W. (2d) 959 (Mo. App., Kansas City 1941 ) .
The instant case presents a desirable solution to the problem that
arises when a debtor distributee, previously discharged in bankruptcy,
attempts to collect his portion of an intestate creditor's real estate. The
cases are largely in accord in permitting the personal representative to
withhold a share of an estate from a distributee who was discharged in
bankruptcy of a debt due the deceased.' However, this rule generally is
limited to personalty and not applied to realty.2 In regard to the distribuwas confiscated by the Russian government and then transferred to the United States.
Thus the problem in the instant case was not there decided. However, this distinction
is not admitted by the majority, but is pointed out by Mr. Justice Stone in the concurring opinion. United States v. Belmont, 3oi U. S. 324, 333 et seq. (1937).
1o. Instant case at 567.
Ii. See concurring opinion of Frankfurter, J., instant case at 567; see also Note
(1937) 37 Coi. L. REv. 1361, 1373, n. 78.
12. United States v. Belmont, 3Ol U. S. 324, 328 (1937).

13. Cf. Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U. S.126, 143 (1938) ; see Levitan, op. cit. supra note 5, at 375.
i. Accord, In re Fussell's Estate, 129 Iowa 498, 105 N. W. 503 (19o5) ; Cucullu's
Succession, 9 La. Ann. Rep. 96 (0854) (Note that this is a Civil Law jurisdiction) ;
Sartor v. Beaty, 25 S.C. 293 (1886) (Distinguishes effect of retainer upon realty and
personalty) ; Wilson v. Kelly, 16 S. C. 216 (1881) (Discharge bars remedy only, not
right); cf. Cherry v. Boultbee, 4 Myl. & C. 442, 41 Eng. Rep. R. 17, (Ch., 1839)
(Assignee of distributee suing executor and court stated executor only entitled to receive bankruptcy dividends); Duffy v. Duffy, 155 Mo. 144, 55 S. W. lOO2 (1899).
Contra: Parker v. Grant, 91 N. C. 338 (1884) (Discharged debt is "extinguished").
2. Sartor v. Beaty, 25 S. C. 293 (1886). See Marvin v. Bowlby, 142 Mich. 245,
255, 1O5 N. W. 751, 754 (19o5), for a discussion of the distinction between realty and
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lion of the deceased's personalty the courts give strength to the moral
obligation to pay a past debt. A deduction of the debt from the debtor
distributee's share is permitted in order to protect the equality of the distribution. This is accomplished by not allowing the debtor distributee to
benefit by a previous acquisition of a portion of the deceased's wealth which
has not been returned to the estate.3 This manner of collecting the past
debt is but an accounting and administrative detail that is a part of the
personal representative's duty.4 But the historical significance of the
established rules of the descent of real property has caused some courts
to speak of this principle as not operative in regard to realty, thereby protecting the cherished certainty of the law of land.' The present set of facts
enables the court to arrive at a feasible solution without disrupting the law
of descent of realty, for the plaintiff is petitioning for the sale of the land
and division of the proceeds.6 The court commendably based its decision
upon an analysis of the purpose of the bankruptcy laws, and was not hampered by an attempt to apply strictly the law of inheritance of real property.
It is well settled that the bankruptcy laws were created to divide the assets
of a debtor among his creditors and then discharge the remaining portion
of the indebtedness so that an honest debtor could start anew, released7
from the threat of judgments arising from a previous business misfortune.
To apply the doctrine of retainer to the discharged debtor in this situation
does not defeat this purpose, whether it is applied to realty or personalty.
The existent moral obligation is satisfied not by depriving the debtor of
his present possessions, but by withholding from him a gratuity.

Declaratory Judgments-Present Dispute Over Construction of
Contract Under Future Contingencies as a Justiciable ControversyParties entered into antenuptial agreement waiving their statutory successoral rights in each other's real and personal property. A simultaneously
executed addendum provided for payment of $io,ooo to the husband out of
the wife's estate in lieu of all rights which he might have in her realty.
Wife sought a declaration that the husband's asserted claim to a share of
her personalty in the event of his survival was invalid. The Supreme Court,
personalty in regard to the right of retainer. This case, however, does not involve the
bankruptcy consideration. But see Loverett v. Veatch, 268 Ky. 797, 105 S. W. (2d)
1052 (1937), (1938) 22 MINN. L. REv. 281 (bankruptcy of distributee not involved).
3. Lietman's Executor v. Lietman, 149 Mo. 112, 119, 50 S. W. 307 (1898);
WArmammA, SE7 OF (ist ed. I869) §§ 189, i9o.
4. This is sometimes called the right of retainer. Care should be exercised when

using the term, because of its two specific legal meanings.

2 WILLIars, EXECUTORS

(12th ed. 1930) 85I. The right of retainer was originally an English practice of allowing the personal representative to keep for himself estate money in payment of deceased's debts to him in a private capacity. THEOBALD, WILus (9th ed. 1939) 687.
Later to prevent a circuity of action and to assemble the wealth of the estate in a liquid
state the personal representative was permitted to balance enforceable debts of the distributee against his share of the estate. For a general discussion see Wilson v. Channell, io2 Kan. 793, 175 Pac. 95 (1918).
5. Cf. Stenson v. H. S. Halvorson Co., 28 N. D. 151, 147 N. W. Boo (1913). Also
see discussion in Marvin v. Bowlby, 142 Mich. 245, 255, 105 N. W. 751, 754 (1905).
6. The plaintiff is asking for the operation of the court and will be expected to be
just if he desires justice. Falconer v. Powe, I Bailey Eq. 156 (S. C. 183o).
7. Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U. S. 459, 473 (1913); Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 U. S.
625, 627 (913) ; Wetmore v. Markoe, I96 U. S. 68, 77 (904).
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reversing the lower court, held (three justices dissenting),' that the remedy
by declaratory judgment was invocable under the 1935 amendment 2 to the
Pennsylvania Declaratory Judgments Act," because there existed an "actual
controversy" arising from the assertion by one spouse, and denial by the
4
Moore v.
other, of a right in which they both had a "concrete interest".
5
1942).
29,
Moore (Pa. Sup. Ct., opinions filed January
By this startling departure from Pennsylvania precedents the Court
has opened the new field of contingent future interests to the application of
the Declaratory Judgments Act. The universal rule has been that a court
will not give advisory opinions,0 nor decide moot cases. 7 After adopting
the Uniform Act in 1923 Pennsylvania led the other American jurisdictions
in this respect; s the rule was laid down in Kariher'sPetition (No. r) 9that
the court must be satisfied that an "actual controversy, or the ripening seeds
of one" 10 exists between the parties and that "the court will not decide
,
future rights in anticipation of an event which may not happen ...
unless . . . present rights depend on the declaration sought by the plain-

tiff." 1 The majority's contention that the 1935 amendment extended the
scope of the Act in that respect does not seem well founded. As pointed
out by Justices Drew and Maxey in their dissenting opinions, the purpose
of the 1935 amendment was to correct a defective judicial interpretation of
the 1923 Act in cases affording a specific statutory remedy. 12 Even if it
is assumed that the introductory sentence of the amendment purports to do
more than restate the rule in Kariher's Petition (No. x),13 the statutory
language does not lend itself easily to the construction put upon it by the
i. Mr. Justice Maxey and Mr. Justice Drew filed separate dissenting opinions, in
both of which Mr. Justice Patterson concurred.
2. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1941) tit. 12, §836. For a quotation of the
pertinent provision in the amendment, see note 14 infra.
3. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 12, § 831 et seq.
4. After deciding the preliminary question of jurisdiction the court held that the
husband's claim was invalid, thus substituting its own discretion for the discretion of
the lower court in granting declaratory relief.
5. Petition for reargument filed Feb. 9, 1942; answer filed Feb. IO, 1942.
6. ANDERSON, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (Ist ed. I940) 151; BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (ist ed. 1934) 54.
7. ANDERSON, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (Ist ed. I94O) 17; BoRcuARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (Ist ed. 1934) 61.
8. Borchard, DeclaratoryJudgments in Penn-sylvania (1934) 82 U. OF PA. L. REV.
317, 327-331.

9. 284 Pa. 455, 131 Atl. 265 (1925).
io. Id. at 471, 131 Atl. at 271.
ii. Id. at 472, 131 At1. at 271. Many cases have since followed the rule: Straus's
Estate, 307 Pa. 454, 161 At. 547 (1932) ; Sterrett's Estate, 300 Pa. 1i6, 15o Atl. 159
(1930) ; Reese v. Adamson, 297 Pa. 13, 146 AtI. 262 (1929) ; Lyman v. Lyman, 293
Pa. 490, 143 Atl. 200 (1928) ; Brown's Estate, 289 Pa. 101, 137 Atl. 132 (1927). The
court brushed these cases aside on the ground that they had been decided before the
passage of the 1935 amendment. However, since the amendment several cases have
followed the rule: Kahn v. William Goldman Theatres, 341 Pa. 32, 17 A. (2d) 340
(1941) ; Capital Bank & Trust Co.'s Petition, 336 Pa. lo8 6 A. (2d) 790 (1939) ;
Quigley's Estate, 329 Pa. 281, 198 At. 85 (1938); Carwithen's Estate, 327 Pa. 49o,

194 Adt. 743 (1937).

12. Borchard, Recent Developments in Declaratory Relief (1936) io TFMP. L. Q.
233.

13. Such assumption seems unwarranted in view of the fact that the Act was
drafted by the late Chief Justice von Moschzisker, who delivered the opinion of the
See Borchard, Recent Developments in Declaracourt in Kariher's Petition (No. i).
tory Relief (1936) IO TEMP. L. Q. 233, 234.
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court.14

It is clear that no "imminent and inevitable litigation" ,15 was

threatened; none could possibly take place before the wife's death. The
court found, however, that there existed an "actual controversy". 16 Both
dissenting opinions sharply challenged this finding and insisted that not
every dispute presents a justiciable controversy. The husband's disputed
right to take a share of the personal property against the will was subject
to at least two conditions precedent (i) that the wife should predecease the
husband and (2) that she die possessed of personal property not needed for
the payment of the debts of her estate.1 7 The wisdom of treating the assertion and denial of so contingent a right as a justiciable controversy may
well be challenged,"' and Justice Drew's fears that the court was opening
the gates to a flood of litigation of an advisory nature upon controversies
which may never arise are not unjustified. Furthermore no practical purpose is served by such premature, if not futile, declarations. The wife's
alleged inability to dispose by will of her personal property with certainty
is unsubstantial.19 A carefully drawn will incorporating alternative provisions could easily take care of the possibility that the husband's claim will
'be sustained.20 No reason can be perceived why in such cases the courts
i4. The amendment provides: "Relief by declaratory judgment may be granted in
all civil cases (i)where an actual controversy exists between contnding parties, or
(2) where the court is satisfied that antagonistic claims are present between the parties
involved which indicate imminent and inevitable litigation, or (3) where in anry suck
case the court is satisfied that a party asserts a legal relation, status, right, or privilege
in which he has a concrete interest and that there is a challenge or denial of such
asserted relation, status, right, or privilege by an adversary party who also has or
asserts a concrete interest therein. .. !" (Italics and numbers supplied.) PA. STAT.
ANN. (Purdon, Supp. i94i) tit. 12, § 836. This text is open to at least two constructions: Either the phrase "in any such case" in (3) refers to the situations described in
(I) and (2)-and (3) becomes wholly superfluous; or it may7 (ungrammatically) be
construed as referring to "all civil cases" generally- and (3) creates an all-inclusive
third class depriving (i)and (2) of any usefulness. Under this second construction
it would be sufficient to find the assertion and denial of a right in which both parties
have a concrete interest. Justice Drew favored the first construction; the second is
implicit in the majority opinion, which seems to rest on the alternative grounds that
there was an actual controversy and that there was an assertion and denial of a right
in which both parties had a concrete interest.
It is plain that the statutory language is quite obscure. The decision should not
hinge on its interpretation, but rather on the fundamental question whether the dispute
was a justiciable controversy, for if the controversy is not a justiciable one the declaration would be a mere advisory opinion.
15. See note 14 supra.
I6. Ibid.
17. Mr. justice Maxey points out in his dissenting opinion that there are really
three contingencies which must be satisfied, the third one being that the wife should
not leave the husband in her will as much as he could take against the will.
It must be noted that the "controversy" can never be one over the husband's right
to take in the event that his wife should die intestate. A declaration concerning such
right would be utterly advisory in nature since it is within her power to cut him off by
making a will. The only declaration in which she can possibly have an interest is one
regarding the husband's right to take against the will.
18. The decision appears to have been influenced by the fact that it was the wife
who brought the action rather than the husband. In the latter eventuality it is believed
the court would be irresistibly inclined to postpone the decision of the issue until such
time when the asserted right would cease to be contingent.
ig. Even if such inability be real it seems to be of the same order as the usual
difficulty encountered by every testator when trying to foresee the composition of his
estate at his death.
20. Thus, even assuming that there was a justiciable controversy and the opinion
was not advisory in nature, the issue raised might be considered as moot because of
lack of sufficient interest in the party bringing the action. This is the conclusion
reached by Mr. Justice Maxey. His dissenting opinion, taken together with Mr.
Justice Drew's, supports the conclusion that the judgment really was an advisory opinion on a moot question, and therefore doubly unconstitutional under the reasoning of
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but prudent admonition not to cross bridges
should disregard the vulgar
2
before coming to them. 1
Mortgages-Pennsylvania Deficiency Judgment Act Applied to
Judgment in Personam Entered Prior to Act-In 1938 mortgagee, having obtained judgment in personam on bond and warrant accompanying
mortgage, bought in the property at sheriff's sale for $6o.

July 16, 1941,

the Pennsylvania Deficiency Judgment Act 1 was passed requiring creditor

to set off against the debt the fair market value 2 of the property rather
than the price brought at the sheriff's sale. 3 August 7, 1941, mortgagee
filed a writ of execution which was refused because of failure to comply
with the Act. Held, impairment of contracts clause of Constitution 4 does
not prevent Act from applying to judgment in personam entered prior to
effective date of Act. Pennsylvania Co. v. Scott, Phila. Leg. Intel., Dec.
24, 1941, p. I, col. 3 (Pa. C. P., Ist Dist., No. 7).
Fidelity-PhiladelphiaTrust Co. v. Allen 5 held the Deficiency Judgment
Act constitutional insofar as it required a mortgagee who, prior to the Act,
had foreclosed by obtaining a judgment in rein, to comply with the Act
before obtaining a personal judgment on the bond for the deficiency. 6 The
instant case raises the question of whether the Act is constitutionally applicable to an execution on a judgment in personam obtained before the Act
was passed.7 Although not basing the decision thereon, the instant court
considered controlling Gelfert v. National City Bank 8 which held the New
York Deficiency Judgment Act 9 constitutional as conflicting with no
Kariher's Petition (No. 1), 284 Pa. 455, 131 At. 265 (1925), which established the
constitutionality of the 1923 Act.
21. Two cases were cited by the majority: Grambo v. South Side Bank & Trust
Co., 141 Pa. Super. 176, 14 A (2d) 925 (194o) (priority of mortgages); Day v. Ostergard, 146 Pa. Super. 27, 21 A. (2d) 586 (1941) (mortgagee's right of possession destroyed by vesting of title in county commissioners after tax sale). Neither involved
contingent interests such as the right involved in the instant case. The case closest on
its facts to the instant case, Merkley v. Merkley, 12 Cal. (2d) 543, 86 P. (2d) 89 (1939),
went the other way.
i. Pa. Laws 1941, No. 151. For an excellent discussion of the Act see Note (1942)
9o U. OF PA. L. REv. 330.
2. For a discussion of the former Pennsylvania attitude toward the fair value
standard see Beaver Co. B. & L. Ass'n v. Winowich, 323 Pa. 483, 5o6, 187 Atl. 481,
491, 492 (936); Market Street National Bank v. Huff, 319 Pa. 286, 287, 288, 179 Atl.
582, 583 (1935). But see Gelfert v. National City Bank, 313 U. S. 221, 234 (I941).
3. The present statute is the culmination of a series of unsuccessful attempts to
alleviate the inequities of the old rule that the price of the foreclosure sale is conclusive
evidence of the value of the property sold. See (i942) 16 T.mp. L. Q. 72.
4. "No State shall . . . pass any . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts." U. S. CONSr. Art. I, § io. "No . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts . . . shall be passed." PA. CoNsT. Art. I, § 17.
5. 22 A. (2d) 896 (Pa. 1941).
6. In Pennsylvania the obligee can proceed either if personam or in rem. "If in
personam he could resort to all the property of the debtor not protected by exemption
laws, and for this purpose could issue one execution after another until the full amount
of the debt was realized. If the obligee chose to proceed by foreclosure of the mortgage, the sum realized at the sale on execution was credited against the indebtedness,
and the mortgagee could then pursue his debtor on the bond for the balance." Beaver
Co. B. & L. Ass'n v. Winowich, 323 Pa. 483, 490, 187 Atl. 481, 484 (1936). See Skilton, Assessing the Mortgage Debtor's Personal Liability (1942), go U. oF PA. L. Rnv.
440, 442.

7. This question was left expressly undecided in Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co.
V. Allen, 22 A. (2d) 896 (Pa. ig4i).
8. 313 U. S. 221 (1941).

9. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr, § 1O83. Cf. THiompsON's LAws oF N. Y. (1939, part II)
1761.
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"vested" right of the creditor. It is submitted, however, that application
of the Gelfert decision to the situation in the instant case is precluded by
the difference in the provisions of the New York and Pennsylvania Acts.10
The main controversy here concerned the nature of the mortgagee's right
before the Act, for "vested" rights cannot be constitutionally disturbed."1
The Pennsylvania cases previous to Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v.
Allen being of little value,' 2 the court adopted the reasoning of the Gelfert
decision, which held the mortgagee's right to be "made whole to the extent
of the debt". 8 Since the Act merely renders it impossible for him to get
more than this, the "vested" right remains intact. But the Pennsylvania
court has indicated that it will not extend the Gelfert reasoning beyond the
exact facts of the Allen case,' 4 so it is necessary to inquire further into the
problem. Although the State must not impair the obligation of a contract
in any way,' 5 a distinction is made between the obligation and the remedy
for enforcement of the contract right.'" The remedy may be changed
io. The New York Act provides that it is to be effective "in all cases where the

sale was held prior to the date this section as hereby amended takes effect and said sale

has not heretofore been confirmed . . . ". The Pa. Act provides in § i, "Whenever

any real property has heretofore been . . . sold" and a deficiency results, "plaintiff
shall petition the court . . . to fix the fair market value of the real property sold as
aforesaid". A comparison of the two Acts shows that the New York statute merely. requires the mortgagee to credit debtor with fair value of the property foreclosed upon
if the confirmation of the sale took place after the Act. Personal judgments, a part of
which remains unsatisfied after a confirmed sale that took place before the Act, are not
disturbed. Therefore the Gelfert decision does not apply to a statute which provides
for the unseating of the unsatisfied portion of a personal judgment which was binding
before the effective date of the Act. No direct precedent can be found in the Federal
cases for the solving of this problem. Note (1942) go U. OF PA. L. REv. 330, 335.
ii. "To change after the event the legal import of that event, would often give
property of A to B." Instant case, unpublished opinion 7,8. See Hodges v. Snyder,
261 U. S. 6oo, 6oi (1923).

12. Although courts of equity could refuse confirmation of unconscionable sales,
this power was rarely used. See Skilton, loc. cit. supra note 6 at 443. An illustration
of the strict Pennsylvania view previous to the Gelfert decision is the statement in Ladner v. Siegel,,298 Pa. 487, 498, 148 At. 699, 702 (1928), "The State cannot, through
legislation, take away a vested right secured by a final judgment . . .; neither may
a court take away a vested right secured by a valid decree or judgment". This is quoted
in the instant case, unpublished opinion, at ix. Cf. Canovaro et al. v. Brothers of the
Order of Hermits of St. Augustine, 326 Pa. 76, 88, 19iAtl. 140, 147 (1937). But cf.
statement of Justice Sharswood in Grim v. Weissenburg School District, 57 Pa. 433,
435 (1868), "All acts curing irregularities in legal proceedings, necessarily divest vested

rights

. . .".

13. "Both the contract and the judgment contemplate that the mortgagee shall be

made whole to the extent of debt . . . and the act . . . has merely sought to aid

the enforcement of the exact, rather than a fortuitously enlarged obligation of the mortgagor. . . .'

Instant case, col. 4. "Mortgagees are constitutionally entitled to no

more than payment in full. They cannot be heard to complain on constitutional
grounds if the legislature takes steps to see to it that they get not more than that." Gelfert v. National City Bank, 313 U. S.221, 233 (1941). Cf. Honeyman v. Jacobs, 302
U. S.539, 542 (1939).
14. The decision in Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Allen, 2 A. (2d) 896
(194) was per curiam, being arrived at by no legal reasoning, but merely on the basis
of Gelfert v. National City Bank, 313 U. S.221 (I941). With reference to the problem in the instant decision, cases were cited that indicated that if confronted with this
case, the court would revert to its, old line of reasoning and hold such an extension of
the Act unconstitutional.
i5."There is no more important provision in the Federal Constitution than the one
which prohibits states from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts, and it is
one of the highest duties of this court to take care the prohibition shall neither be
altered nor frittered away." Strong, J., in Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 432, 448
(1878). See Bank of Minden v, Clement, 256 U. S. 126, 128 (1921); Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 286 (U. S. 1827).
i6. See Marshall, C. J., in Sturges v. Crowinshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 2oo (U. S.
IT19) ; see also Commonwealth v. Commissioners, 23 Mass. 5oi, 5o8 (1828) ; RorrscrAEFFmz, CoNsTnUTIoNAI. LAW (i939) 573.
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if the obligation is not substantially impaired thereby,1 7 for there is no
"vested" right in any particular remedy.' But a remedy is often so important to the obligation that a change in it materially affects that obligation. 19
Cases have held that if the debtor's exemption is enlarged, the Act is unconstitutional as to prior creditors. 20 Also statutes exempting cash value of
life insurance policies from execution are invalid as to prior creditors ; 21.
otherwise such creditors would lose substantial rights.2 2 Likewise a statute
exempting the homestead of the debtor was held-to impair the obligation of
prior contracts,23 as was a requirement that property not to be sold for less
than two-thirds of its value.2 - Therefore, if the test is to be that a right
has been impaired if the value of the obligation has by legislation been

diminished, 25 then the instant case must fail, for the mortgagee, at the time
of the judgment, was entitled to more than the Act allows him. It is submitted, however, that the instant case should and can stand. Since the Act
does not preclude a deficiency judgment, the mortgagee may still receive
full payment and his right is fully protected. The objection to this is that
the creditor has the alternative of bidding in the land at its fair value or of
losing the security, thus paying him off in land rather than money. Yet
this right to be paid in full in cash is not absolute, for this objection has
not prevented courts in times of emergency from allowing a reasonable
modification of the terms of a contract by the legislature in the interest of
public welfare.26 Certainly the requirement that an efficacious remedy
remain,2 7 is complied with. As to the possibility of disturbing a "vested"
right, the distinction between "vested" and "non-vested", or "protected"
and "non-protected" rights is tenuous. It is of use principally as a reason
for a decision already reached on other grounds.28 Such an indistinct distinction should not hamper a desired result. The true test is one of the

17. Wilson v. Standefer, 184 U. S.399 (1902); see Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. 6Io,
623 (U. S. 1872) ; Beers v. Hanghton, 9 Pet. 329, 358 (U. S.1835) ; HALL,CoNSTTuTIONAL LAW (igii) 233; Bunn, The Impairment of Contracts: Mortgage and Insurance Moratoria (1933) I U. OF Ci. L. RrV. 249, 251.
18. See Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Oshkosh, 187 U. S.437, 439 (i9o3) ; Willard
v. Harvey, 24 N. H. 344, 352 (1852). But see Memphis v. United States, 97 U. S.
293, 296 (1877).
ig. Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535 (U. S.1866) ; Bronson v. Kinzie, I How. 311 CU. S.1843); see Richmond Mortgage & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia
Bank, 30o U. S. 124, 128 (1937).

2o. W. B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U. S. 426 (934); Edwards v. Kearzey,
96 U. S. 595 (877).
21. Bank of Minden v. Clement, 256 U. S. 126 (1921) ; Samuels v. Quartin, io8
F. (2d) 789 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940); Brown v. Gordon; go F. (2d) 583 (C. C. A. 2d,
1937).
22. Brown v. Gordon, go F. (2d) 583 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
23. Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595 (1877); Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. 61o
(U. S.1872); McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 6o8 (U. S.1844).
24. Bronson v. Kinzie, i How. 311 (U. S.1843).
25. Bank of Minden v. Clement, 256 U. S.126 (i92i) ; Planters' Bank of Mississippi v. Sharp, 6 How. 301 (U. S.1848). "One of the tests that a contract has been
impaired is that its value has by legislation been diminished. It is not, by the Constitution, to be impaired at all. This is not a question of degree or manner or cause, but
of encroaching in any respect on its obligation." Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 23,
257 (U. S. 1827).

26. Home B. & L. Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S.398 (1934) ; cf. Rent cases, Levy
Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U. S.242 (1922); Marcus Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256
U. S. 170 (1921) ; Block v. Hirsch, 256 U. S. 135 (192).
27. "A change of remedies that gives a party as effective a remedy to protect his
rights as he had when the contract was made is valid. RorrscaAEFrmg, CONsTITU'IONAL LAW (939) 573; see Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 531 553 (U. S.

1866); Conley v. Barton, 26o U. S.677 (1923).
28. See Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights in
CoxsTiTU IOx A. LAW (1938) 279.

2 SELEcrE

EssAys ON

RECENT CASES

reasonableness of the legislation. If the regulation is reasonable courts will
enforce it and decide that no "vested" right is interfered with.m Certainly
the right of the mortgagee to more than the amount of the debt amounts to
a windfall and, not being sacred or inviolable, cannot be described as
"vested". 80 It has been well said that "Courts do not regard rights as
vested contrary to the justice and equity of the case". 1 Since both justice
and equity sustain the present decision and the mortgagee's right to payment is not substantially disturbed, if at all, there seems to be no ground
for criticising the present decision. If the "lessons that another century
has taught" 32 allow reasonable impairment of an obligation, certainly there
is no magic in a judgment to warrant it special protection.
Taxation-Taxability of Relinquishment of Power of Appointment Under Federal Gift Tax-Husband and wife each contributed
one-half to the corpus of a trust, reserving to themselves jointly, or to the
survivor, the power to modify terms and substitute beneficiaries, but providing that they could not recapture the corpus. Husband died and the
one-half he contributed was included in his estate tax. Later, wife relinquished the power to substitute beneficiaries and alter the trust. Held
(affirming the Board of Tax Appeals),' that this last transaction was not
subject to the federal gift tax as to the value of the portion furnished by
the husband. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Solomon, 124 F. (2d)
86 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941).
Although the settlors could not revest the trust property in themselves,
there is no doubt that, at the creation of the trust, the gift was not sufficiently complete to be taxable under the gift tax because of the power
reserved to modify terms and substitute beneficiaries. 2 It also seems certain
that the husband's contribution was correctly included in his federal estate
tax." It is not taxed as a general power of appointment under Section
81I (f),4 but as a reserved power to alter or amend under Section 811 (d).5
Finally, it appears settled that the wife's gift was complete and subject to
gift taxation when she relinquished control by giving up her power to
amend, 6 and tax liability for the amount of her contribution is admitted.'
29. The contracts clause has been unsuccessfully argued in an attempt to protect
the contracts of public utilities and their customers from the interference of state regulation. If the regulation is reasonable, the court will not interfere. Producers' Transportation Co. v. R. R. Commission, 251 U. S. 228 (192o); Union Dry Goods Co. v.
Georgia Public Service Corp., 248 U. S. 372 (1919).
30. 2 AuSTIN, JURISPRUDEN E (1874) § 1138.
31. State v. Newark, 3 Dutcher 185, 197 (N. J. 1858).
32. Gelfert v. National City Bank, 313 U. S. 221, 235 (1941).
i. Amelia Solomon, 43 B. T. A. 234 (1941).
2. Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 39 (939) ; Hesslein v. Hoey, 91
F. (2d) 954 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 756 (1937); accord, Burnet
v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 280 (I933).
3. Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U. S. V (1933). As to the taxation of joint interests, see INT. REv. CODE, §8II(e) (ig4o) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 8o, Art. 93 (937):
Colonial Trust Co. v. Commissioner, iI1 F. (2d) 740 (C. C. A. 2d, 194o).

4. Formerly Section 302(f).

5. Section 8ii(d) (formerly Section 302(d))

reads "power

.

.

.

to alter,

amend, revoke, or terminate". As the clause is in the disjunctive, power to revoke is
not necessary; power to alter or amend is enough. Porter v. Commissioner 288 U. S.
436 (933) ; Griswold, Powers of Appointmtent and the Federal Estate Tax (1939) 5z
HAv. L. REv. 929, 943.
6. Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 39 (1939) ; Mead's Estate, 41 B.
T. A. 424 (I94O) ; see Hesslein v. Hoey, 91 F. (2d) 954, 956 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).

7. Instant case at 87.
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But the wife had the same command 8 over the portion furnished by her
husband; it was control over the whole corpus that she was giving away.
As to her own contribution, however, she had a reserved or self-created
power 9; but as to her husband's, it was a power of appointment situation,
for a donor had given her the power to nominate the beneficiary. So the
issue is whether the relinquishment of this power is subject to the gift tax.' 0
At common law, the appointee of a power of appointment was said to take
from the donor of the power, and not from the donee, so that at the latter's
death property passing under such a power was not taxable as part of his
estate I' even though realistically the donee did have control over the property. Therefbre, a special provision was written into the estate tax to tax
general powers of appointment.Y2 There is no such special provision in the
gift tax, so logically such a transfer is not taxed. But the Sanford case 's
declares that the gift and the estate taxes are supplementary or in pari
materia, so that if a transfer would be taxable under the estate tax if made
at death, then the same transfer inter vivos is subject to the gift tax, for an
important purpose of the gift tax was to prevent avoidance of the estate
tax.'1 4 Following this argument, any provision of the estate tax would also
apply to the gift tax. 5 But the transfer in the instant case would not be
taxable under the estate tax, for it doesn't come within the terms of Section
8II (f) which requires the property pass under the exercise of the power,',
even if it is assumed that the power is general.' 7 The court appears to
believe that this transaction should not be taxed because a tax has already
been paid in respect to the husband's contribution,' 8 but this reason is not
sound.' 9 If there had been a transfer of property by the wife, then it would
be taxed. There would be two taxes, because there were two transfers.
8. ". . . taxation is not so much concerned with the refinements of title as it is
with actual command over the property taxed. . . ." Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S
376, 378 (930) ; Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 280, 283 (933).

9.". . . there is one situation where, despite the language of the statute, a tax
[estate] may result from a special power, either exercised or not exercised." Griswold, Powers of Appointewnt and the Federal Tax (1939) 52 HAxv.L. Rlv. 929, 943.
io. "The Revenue Act in question is Section 5Ol (a) of the Act of 1932." Instant
case at 87. This section is now Section iooo(a) of the INT. REv. CODE (1940).
ii. United States v. Field, 255 U. S. 257 (I92I); Emmons v. Shaw, 171 Mass.
410, 50 N. E. 1033 (I8p8).
12. INT. R1v. CODE, § 8i (f) (1940); cf. Revenue Acts of i918 and 1921, § 4o2(e);
Revenue Acts of 1924 and 1926, § 302(f).
13. Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 3o8 U. S.39 (1939).
14. Id. at 44. But it was also an important purpose of the gift tax to prevent income tax avoidance. See Warren, Correlation of Gift and Estate Taxes (94)
55
HAxv.L. REv. I, 18 et seq.
1S. Suppose in respect to a particular problem the cases had settled the law both
under the estate tax and the gift tax and then a statute was passed altering the estate
tax. Would the law be changed in respect to the gift tax?
16. Helvering v. Grinnell, 294 U. S. 153 (1935), 45 YALE L. J. 172; Estate of
Shepherd, 32 B. T. A. 2o8 (1935) ; cf. Estate of Morris, 38 B. T. A. 408 (1938).
17. Probably. the weakest part of the opinion inthe instant case is where it discusses whether the wife has a general power of appointment. Instant case at 88-89.
The opinion points out first that this is not a special power of appointment as defined
by Mr. Justice Roberts in Morgan v. Commissioner, 3o9 U. S. 78, 81 (940), and as
defined in REsTATEmENT, PRoPERTY (1940) §320(2). Then the opinion states that
this is not a general power as defined in the above case and by Section 320(I) of the
RESTATEMENT. But the RESTATEMENT, § 320, comment a, declares that some powers,

specifically including the one here in question, are hybrids partaking to some extent of
the characteristics of both types of powers. They may be treated as general for some
purposes and special for others. Thus, the court fails to answer the problem that it
puts before itself, whether this power is a general power for this purpose.
I8.Instant case at 89.
1g. But it is true that a gift tax paid on a gift in contemplation of death can be
credited against the estate tax on the same gift. INT. REv. CODE § 813(a) (194o).
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The husband's contribution escapes gift taxation, not because of a desire to
avoid a second taxation of the fund, but because this is not a transfer of
property within the terms of the statute.
Trusts-Testamentary Trust Created by Reference in Trust Instrument to Settlor's Will to Determine Beneficiary-Settlor, by deed
of trust, assigned to trustee life insurance policies, the proceeds of which
were then payable to his executors or administrators, to collect and pay the
proceeds to "the Trustees named in the last Will and Testament of the
Settlor to be thereafter held by them under the same uses and trusts and
with like distribution as in said Will set forth with reference to the residuary estate of the Settlor." Settlor, by will of the same date (and which
was probated as his last will), bequeathed his residuary estate in trust for
the benefit of his wife and descendants. Held, the policies were not exempt1
from the claims of creditors, as policies "assigned to the wife or children".
The trust was testamentary, and the proceeds of the policies were subject
to the claims of creditors.2 In re Kenin's Trust Estate, 23 A. (2d) 837
(Pa. 194-).
For the creation of a present trust there must be a present designation
of the beneficiary, the res, and the trustee.' In the absence of these requirements no trust is created but may arise at the time when such omission is
supplied. 4 If the beneficiary is to be designated by an act of the settlor
which is testamentary, the intended trust is testamentary.5 The instant
decision illustrates a line of distinction between inter vivos and testamentary
trusts insofar as a reference in the trust instrument to the settlor's will is
concerned. Reference to a particularinstrument which happens to be the
will of the settlor, to determine the beneficiary, does not make the trust a
testamentary one.8 By such a reference the words of that will are incorporated into the trust instrument, and have effect, insofar as the trust is
concerned, as a part of the trust instrument, not as a will.7 Reference to
. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 40, § 517, provides: "The net amount payable under any policy of life insurance or under any annuity contract upon the life of
any person, heretofore or hereafter made for the benefit of or assigned to the wife or
children or dependent relative of such person, shall be exempt from all claims of the
creditors of such person arising out of or based upon any obligation created after the
passage of this act, whether or not the right to change the named beneficiary is reserved by or permitted to such person."
2. For a general discussion of unfunded life insurance trusts, see Phillips, The
Testamentary Characterof Personal Unfunded Life Insurance Trusts (1934) 82 U. oF
PA. L. REV. 700.
3. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 26, comments c, d, e.
4. Ibid.
5. This test, of designation "by an act which is testamentary", is suggested in RESTATIEMNT, TRUSTS (1935) § 56, comment e, and would seem an accurate one. Communication of the identity of the beneficiary to trustee or beneficiary before the death of
the settlor is not of controlling significance. Van Cott v. Prentice, 104 N. Y. 45, 10
N. E. 257 (1887) (beneficiary named in a writing delivered to the trustee, but not to
be opened until settlor's death). Nor should it be controlling that the beneficiary is
not determined prior to the settlor's death, if the determining factor is not a testamentary act of the settlor. See RESTATmENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 56, comment g; i
ScoTt, TRUSTS (1939) § 56.4.
6. Douglas's Estate, 303 Pa. 227, 154 Atl. 376 (1931) (trust instrument referred
to "her last will and testament bearing date the Thirtieth day of August, 1918, witnessed by . . .") ; Hanmnett v. Farrar, 29 S. W. (2d) 949 (Tex. Com. App. 1930)
(trust instrument referred to "my will dated the 29th day of November, 1921, and executed in the presence of . . ").
7. The problem was directly considered in Hammett v. Farrar, ibid., and the Commission held that the beneficiary so designated "took ,the property . . . by operation
of the deed of trust, and not by devise or inheritance.
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"the last will of the settlor" or to "my last will" to determine the beneficiary,
however, has an entirely different effect. The instant decision holds that
such a reference makes the trust a testamentary one, and that is the accepted
view today.8 The law might have developed the other way. A layman,
who has made a will, might intend by a reference to his "last will and
testament" to refer to the instrument then in existence. In a popular, nontechnical sense, that instrument is at that time his "last will and testament". 9 But the phrase has a different meaning in the eyes of the law. A
will does not become effective until the maker dies, and a reference to the
last will and testament is, to the judicial mind, a reference to that instrument which becomes effective upon the death of its maker as his will. The
resolution of the possible ambiguity in the meaning of the phrase is a reasonable one. The construction is established, and its judicial reiteration
should caution the profession that the distinction has become a matter of
draftsmanship, not of litigation. 10
8. Loring v. Massachusetts Horticultural Society, 171 Mass. 401, 50 N. E. 936

(i898) ; Myers's Estate, 309 Pa. 581, 164 Atl. 6xi (1933) ; I SCOTT, TRUSTS (1939)
§ 56.4; cf. Frost v. Frost, 202 Mass. ioO, 88 N. E. 446 (iog) (attempted assignment
to "the trustee to be named in my will"). But cf. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Hall,
125 N. J. Eq. 419, 6 A. (2d) 124 (1939) (trust instrument directed payment of corpus,

upon death of settlor, to such persons and in such portions as settlor "may designate
. . . in and by her last will and testament . . 2').
9. Such an analysis is employed in Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Hall, id. at 426-428,
6 A. (2d) at 128-129.

io. There was no indication in the Court's opinion that the trust instrument was
referred to in the will, nor that the trust instrument met the formal requirements of the
statute of wills. It might be questioned, therefore, whether the trust instrument could
be operative in the creation of a testamentary trust. For the decision, however, the
point was not important. The significant point was that there was not a valid inter
vivos trust, and that therefore the proceeds of the policies were subject to the claims
of the testator's creditors.

